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Biomass: Its Utilization as Food and/or Fuel 
Abundant and inexpensive supplies of food and energy were an 
important part of the unprecendent economic growth following World War 
II. By 1973-74, however, world events had reversed this favorable 
situation and marked a turning point from which there is no visible 
return. The OPEC oil embargo, crop shortfalls, and the Russian 
purchase of surplus grain stocks signaled the end of abundance and low 
prices for both commodities. Periodic poor harvests and OPEC supply 
control and pricing of oil since the embargo have been frequent remin-
ders of the fragile supply conditions that continue in both energy and 
food markets. 
Energy and food have not been affected equally by these events. 
Energy prices and particularly oil prices have risen more rapidly than 
food prices. As well, more countries are critically dependent on 
imported oil than on imported food. Concerns about energy supplies 
are further heightened by political instability in many of the oil 
exporting countries. These conditions have created a positive 
environment for alcohol programs. Some countries are initiating 
domestic alcohol programs as a partial solution to oil shortages. 
Others are giving serious study to potential alcohol programs. The 
search for secure domestically produced liquid fuels is the primary 
reason for this broad interest in alcohol. In addition, sugar and 
starch feedstocks are generally available in most countries; the 
processing technology is known and improving, and alcohol is a good 
substitute for petroleum products in many uses. 
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In many countries, however, there are serious food-fuel 
conflicts. Most agricultural resources are already committed to food, 
feed and fiber production, liquid fuel needs in relation to potential 
alcohol production are very great, and energy prices will continue to 
rise as energy supplies are further depleted. Thus, in the consider-
ation of alcohol programs the food-fuel trade off is a very important 
issue and promises to become more important during the 1980s. 
In the following section, I look briefly at the changing rela-
tionship between energy and food and at the issues this changing rela-
tionship raises. This is followed in order by discussions of energy 
supply and pricing, food production and trade, and non-market factors. 
A classification of countries is then presented to help identify which 
countries are likely to be early candidates for alcohol programs and 
hence what food supplies are likely to be affected. Finally, two case 
studies are described briefly; Brazil, which has already opted for a 
major alcohol program, and the United States, which is a dominant 
force in both energy and food markets. 
The Food/Energy Relationship 
The relationship between food and energy has been a most for-
tunate event for economic progress. It has been largely a one-way 
relationship with energy serving as a primary input to agriculture. 
In fact, modern agriculture and indeed most economic development has 
been built on a foundation of cheap energy. Fertilizers, 
mechanization, pesticides and irrigation all require large inputs of 
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energy, and with abundant supplies and low prices for natural gas and 
petroleum, these inputs have fueled the technological revolution in 
agriculture. In fact, it has been argued that over one-half of corn 
productivity in the United States results from direct energy inputs. 
Further, historic low energy prices relative to food prices have made 
food supplies uneconomic as energy feedstocks under most conditions. 
Thus, with the exception of crop residues and wastes, agricultural 
resources have been reserved largely for food, feed and fiber produc-
tion in most areas of the world. 
The food-energy relationship, however, is changing. Recent 
energy price increases and future anticipated increases promise to 
make the energy claim on agriculture resources more general throughout 
the world. In most cases, biomass sources have only limited potential 
to supply a significant portion of domestic energy needs. But the 
threat this holds for the availability and cost of food supplies has 
raised concerns about the dual food-fuel use of agricultural resources 
and about the energy intensive nature of modern agricultural tech-
nology. Since each country has a unique resource situation relative 
· to energy supplies and agricultural production, the level and nature 
of concern varies considerably. Some countries feel the need to sup-
port an alcohol from biomass industry before it is economic. Others 
feel the need to protect domestic food production. 
Rising energy prices will force policy makers in many countries 
to face the difficult food-fuel question directly. All countries, of 
course, will be affected by the food-fuel choices of others. Several 
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have already made substantial commitments to alcohol programs. Brazil 
for example imports 80% of its petroleum needs, is a major net 
exporter of agricultural products and has vast underutilized land 
resources. This situation has influenced Brazil to institute a 
massive alcohol program as a substitute for imported petroleum. Food 
importing countries may feel they do not have this choice or may in 
fact need to protect domestic food supplies. The situation in the 
United States is unique. The U.S. imports almost 50 percent of 
petroleum needs, consumes over one-fourth of all petroleum produced in 
the world, and is the major exporter of agricultural products to the 
rest of the world. The magnitude of both U.S. demand for liquid fuels 
and its share of world agricultural trade make the U.S. policy choices 
on food and fuel of critical importance both domestically and for many 
areas of the world. We will return to a more detailed look at these 
two countries later. 
In the broadest context the urgency for making choices in energy 
or food will be determined by the relative world scarcity of food and 
energy and the subsequent impact of this scarcity on relative prices. 
Currently, food energy price relationships favor using agricultural 
resources for food production in most countries. Recent estimates 
suggest, however, that energy supply problems will become more critical 
than food shortages during the 1980s. When rising incomes and popula-
tion growth estimates are balanced against production levels for both 
food and energy, it appears that energy markets will experience a more 
rapid demand increase and an earlier plateau of supply than is antici-
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pated for food markets. As energy prices rise, more and more 
countries will be forced or enticed into alcohol programs. 
Presently, alcohol from crops is the easiest to produce and to 
blend with gasoline. Woods, residues and other sources may eventually 
provide a larger base for alcohol production for some countries than 
will food crops. But in the immediate time frame, during the decade 
of the 1980s, crops and principally sugar and grain crops will be the 
primary source of alcohol. Since these crops are food crops and will 
occupy land used to produce other food crops we can expect food prices 
to also rise. But at least in the short term, food has a stronger 
supply response capability, therefore prices will not rise as rapidly 
as for energy. Since each country has a unique set of resources a 
series of non-economic factors will also affect the food-fuel choices. 
These include national security concerns, foreign exchange needs, a 
situation of excess or deficit food production, the existence of 
unused land, and the availability of domestic energy resources. These 
and other factors will either help the process along or impede its 
progress on an individual country basis. In the final analysis, 
however, the most important dominant factor will be the world price 
level for energy and particularly for oil. We turn next to a consi-
deration of energy supply and pricing. 
Energy Supply and Pricing 
World energy resources are very unevenly distributed in terms of 
known reserves, production and use. Coal is the most abundant 
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resource, representing over two-thirds of the fossil fuel reserves but 
less than one-fifth of world energy use. Coal is found in abundance 
in only a few countries with 80 percent of the reserves located in the 
United States (31%) and the communist countries. Oil, which repre-
sents only about one-sixth of the world energy reserves is currently 
providing over one-half of energy use. Most of the oil reserves and 
almost all of the free world trade in oil come from the Middle East 
Arab OPEC countries. The rest of the world, including many of the 
industrialized countries and most of the tropical, less developed 
areas of Africa, Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia are rela-
tively energy poor. 
Oil is clearly the energy resource which dominates world markets. 
Very high use levels relative to known reserves, historic low produc-
tion costs, ease of transport and use, and lack of readily available 
substitutes for this premium liquid fuel have led to over production 
and consumption of oil relative to reserves. Most future scenarios 
point to supply/demand imbalances for petroleum by 1985. There is 
general agreement that prices will go higher though some uncertainty 
about exactly when, how high, and how fast. The uncertainty on the 
demand side comes largely from the unknown level of conservation 
efforts, principally in the United States, the impact of the current 
recession on the demand levels for petroleum, and the degree to which 
the historic link between economic growth and energy use can be 
broken. On the supply side there are some uncertainties relative to 
the response to higher prices and to the political stahilfty of th0 
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major oil exporting countries. Thus, the timing of significant future 
price increases could be within a few months if political instability 
continues in the Middle East, by 1985 with normal supply/demand 
relationships, and perhaps extended closer to 1990 with favorable 
events on both the supply and demand side. However, in any of the 
alternatives, the time frame is fairly short for the development of 
alternative liquid fuels. 
What then are the prospects for oil production levels and prices 
in the near future? As noted above, most scenarios call for a short-
fall by 1985. Events through late 1980 in the major oil producing 
countries generally supported this possibility. U.S. new oil disco-
veries were running at only 20 percent of U.S. oil use and 40 percent 
of U.S. production. North Slope oil had temporarily raised U.S. pro-
duction slightly, while Russian production has plateaued. The unex-
pected shut down of Iranian production in early 1979 caused a 
temporary shortage of oil in world markets. The current Iranian-Iraq 
conflict continues this instability. Saudi Arabia had raised produc-
tion temporarily from 8.5 million barrels a day to 9.5 million barrels 
a day following the Iranian revolution and then to 10.4 million 
barrels a day to help make up losses from the Iran-Iraq conflict. 
However there is no indication of willingness to maintain this 
increased flow on a sustained basis. The strength of short run demand 
is evident in a general willingness by consuming nations to pay much 
higher oil prices. Clearly, retail gasoline prices two to three times 
greater than U.S. levels in many countries is further evidence that 
demand for liquid fuels will continue at significantly higher prices. 
Thus, it seems plausible to assume that we are moving toward the 
substantially higher prices anticipated for the 1980s. 
Higher petroleum prices will in turn cause two general reactions: 
1) a more serious attempt at conservation to at least moderate the 
increase in petroleum demand, and 2) an expanded search for alter-
native energy sources. In the liquid fuel area, three major alter-
natives are being considered. They are the so-called synthetic fuels 
derived from shale oil, coal, and biomass. Like oil, shale and coal 
based synthetic fuels are located in a few countries only. In 
addition, capital, technology, environmental issues, and water 
requirements are likely to delay substantial production of these fuels 
until well beyond the projected oil supply shortfall. Biomass, a 
renewable resource, is currently available in various quantities in 
most areas of the world in both waste and food (or feed) forms. It is 
seen by some as the principal short-run solution to fill the gap in 
liquid fuel needs, but to others such as Brazil, it is the principal 
long-run solution. 
Within the time frame of the oil problem as defined above, 
(before 1990) alcohol from sugar and starch crops is the only alter-
native that can provide significant quantities of liquid fuels. Shale 
oil, coal liquids and alcohol from cellulosic material all hold promise 
for providing eventually greater quantities of alcohol than is avail-
able through starch and sugar products. However, none of these sources 
will be available in any quantity before 1990. 
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It is also instructive to look at the relative cost of the 
alternatives. In October of 1980, imported cost of crude oil to refi-
neries in the United States was about $35 a barrel (Table 1). An 
equivalent price for alcohol from sugar cane in Brazil is $30-$35 a 
barrel. This is based on a sugar cane cost of production of about 
$12-$14 a ton. Alcohol from corn in the United States is currently 
costing about $40-$45 a barrel equivalent. This would reflect corn 
prices of $2.50-$3.00 a bushel. The synthetic fuels from shale and 
coal in the United States are now projected to cost between $50-$60 a 
barrel. Technologies for producing alcohol from cellulosic material 
are still being developed and accurate estimates of production costs 
are not available at this time. 
If we consider shale oil and coal liquids as the primary longer 
run price ceiling for liquid fuels, then it is clear that alcohol from 
biomass will be very competitive as an alternative energy source. 
Agricultural Production and Trade 
As in the case of energy, the basic food resources are not evenly 
distributed. However, while the basic production resource, land, is 
generally considered to be in finite supply, the application of 
technology, capital, and labor has allowed the natural productivity of 
land to be increased several fold in many areas of the world. As 
noted earlier, energy in the form of fertilizer, pesticides, 
machinery, and irrigation has been a major ingredient in increased 
productivity. Thus, as energy prices rise, costs of producing food 
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will also rise, especially in areas of intensive modern agriculture. 
Table 1. Estimated Relative Costs of 
Alternative Liquid Fuels, 1980 
Source 
Value Per Barrel 
of Crude Oil 
Equivalentl 
Value Per U.S. 
Gallon Of 
Liquid Fuel2 
(Dollars-U.S.) 
Imported Crude Oil--USA $35 
Alcohol--Sugar Cane--Brazil3 $30-$35 
Alcohol--Corn--USA4 $40-$45 
Synthetic Fuels--Coal, Shale--USA $50-$60 
1 Delivered to refinery 
2 At refinery or distillery 
3 Sugar cane production costs of $12-$14 per ton 
4 Corn costs of $2.50-$3.00 per bushel 
$1.08 
$ .93-$1.08 
$1.24-$1.39 
$1.55-$1.86 
The substantial differences among countries in the relative 
quality and quantity of food production resources has given rise to 
comparative advantages in the production of specific agricultural pro-
ducts and to differences in the total volume of production. Both con-
ditions have lead to trade in agricultural commodities. Also, annual 
supply variations are greater in food markets than in energy markets 
since agricultural production is still largely affected by variation 
in annual weather. When poor crops are experienced simultaneously in 
major producing regions of the world, the impact on price and quantity 
of agricultural products moving in world trade is substantial. 
These general conditions of food production and use have given 
rise to alternate feelings of optimism and despair concerning the 
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world's ability to feed itself. The uneven distribution of food 
resources, especially in times of crop failure, has raised moral 
issues of "over eating" by some populations when others suffer from 
"inadequate diets." Shortages and higher prices of petroleum reduce 
the availability or increase the cost of the energy input to agri-
cultural production and hence affect food productivity. This, 
together with the use of traditional food production resources for the 
production of energy crops will increase further the moral concern. 
A commonly held concept is that the U.S. with its great surplus 
of agricultural production should or could "feed the world." In fact, 
the great bulk of food consumed in the world is produced in the con-
sumption areas with about 11 percent of world agricultural production 
moving in trade. The few major importers of agricultural products are 
industrialized countries or raw material exporting countries that 
generate sufficient foreign exchange earnings to enable them to 
purchase substantial agricultural products (i.e. Western Europe, 
Japan), and those few agricultural countries that possess unique pro-
duction resources for specific food crops such as sugar, and coffee. 
The U.S. has a unique agricultural potential in the production of 
food and feed grains, and soybeans well in excess of domestic needs 
and at cost levels that are very competitive in world markets. As a 
consequence almost 30 percent of U.S. feed grain production (corn, 
sorghum, oats, barley), two-thirds of wheat production, and over one-
half of soybean production are exported. However, while exports of 
grains and soybeans from the U.S. represent a significant quantity of 
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U.S. production, they account for less than 7 percent of world 
production. Among agricultural exporters, the U.S. occupies a domi-
nate position accounting for over 40 percent of all cereals and about 
20 percent of total agricultural products moving in world trade 
(Table 2). 
The grains are the principal source of both calories and protein 
for most populations of the world (1). They are also a feed input for 
livestock, which in turn provides one-third of the protein in world 
diets. (Table 3) 
Table 2. MAJOR AGRICULTURAL EXPORTING COUNTRIES, 1974-76 
Agricultural Exports 
All Total Exports 
Countr}'.: Cereals Food (Value) % 
(Billions of Dollars) 
U.S.A. 10. 7 17 .4 19.2 21 
Brazil .2 3.2 4.9 5 
Australia 1.6 3.8 3.8 4 
France 2.2 3.7 3.7 4 
Canada 2.3 2.8 2.8 3 
Argentina 1.3 2.6 2.7 3 
Thailand .8 1.6 1.9 2 
19.1 35.1 39.0 43 
World 25.1 73.3 90.6 100 
Source: F.A.O. preliminary data. 
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Table 3. Food Sources for World Diet 
Total Food 
Energy Avera~e World Diet 
Food Source Produced Calories Protein 
(percent) (percent) 
Grains 68 52 47 
Roots and tubers 8 8 5 
Sugar 5 9 
Vegetables, oils seeds, 
pulses 9 12 15 
Fruits 1 2 1 
Livestock 9 17 32 
100 100 100 
Source (adapted from 1). 
While root crops are a stable food for many populations in the world, 
their bulk and perishability dictate that they be produced largely for 
local consumption. Livestock products are similarly produced locally 
and in general feed is moved to the livestock when in deficit supply. 
Also, the distinction between food and feed varies by country. In the 
U.S. wheat is a principal food crop, while in Russia it is also a 
major feed crop. For certain non-market considerations--the food-feed 
distinction appears to be a significant concept. 
Trends in world grain trade show a significant erosion in the 
number of surplus production areas and the dramatic emergence of North 
America as the principal source of surplus grain (Table 4). For 
example, in the 1930s all major areas of the world, with the exception 
of Europe, were surplus grain producers with minor net quantities 
exported to Europe. This has gradually changed over time and now in 
-14-
the late 1970s North America, and principally the United States, is 
the only major grain export region. While individual countries may be 
net grain exporters, the major regions as a whole are not. 
In spite of these regional differences in the production and trade 
in grain, overall production in agriculture is increasing. Therefore, 
while the prospects for energy markets appear to point toward substan-
tial price increases as limited supplies are balanced against rising 
Table 4. The Changing Pattern of World Grain Trade, 
Net Imports and Exports by Region. 
Region 
North America 
Latin America 
Western Europe 
Eastern Europe 
& USSR 
Africa 
Asia 
Australia & 
New Zealand 
1934-38 
+ 5 
+ 9 
-24 
+ 5 
+ 1 
+ 2 
+ 3 
Source - Brown, FAQ (2, 4) 
1960 1975 
(million metric tons) 
+39 +84 
0 - 3 
-25 -20 
0 -20 
- 2 - 8 
-17 -45 
+ 6 +12 
1978 
103 
- 4 
-19 
-28 
-12 
-50 
+10 
demand, the projections for food markets indicate continuing produc-
tion increases that will mitigate to some extent the price pressure 
from increased demand. World food production has increased at an 
annual rate of just under 3 percent during the 1970s, placing it 
slightly ahead of population growth. USDA and FAO projections through 
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1985 indicate that this relationship will be maintained though there 
will be times and places of critical shortages. Some areas of the 
world will fare better than others. Food production levels in Africa 
and Latin America, for example, have not kept pace with populations 
increasing at near 3 percent per year. Asia is maintaining historic 
food-population balances and may be showing slight improvement. North 
America (principally the United States) shows strong potential for 
continued food production growth well in excess of projected demand 
based on growth and income. Thus, within the assumptions of normal 
weather patterns and the absence of disruptions by non-market factors, 
a fairly constant real price level for food is projected through 1985. 
We may then expect an increase in the relative profitability of energy 
crops as they compete with food crops for the use of agricultural 
resources. 
World markets, however, are not free to choose the "most 
profitable" economic use of resources. Nation states and other groups 
often intervene in markets to achieve political ends. These non-
market forces are considered next. 
Some Non-Market Considerations 
The uneven distribution of food production and energy resources 
among countries results in the trade of these commodities as described 
earlier. However, it also gives rise to some non-market activities 
that are undertaken by nations to protect their own interests. In 
some instances, these activities take the form of direct intervention 
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in the market mechanisms. Price supports for domestic food 
production, input subsidies, tariffs, etc. are various means of 
altering the relative profitability of production and trade. Import 
quotas and production limitations are more direct forms of 
intervention. 
The issue is to recognize that the political process may inter-
vene in a substantial way in the operation of free markets if this 
will better serve the national interests. We have many examples. 
Brazil, for years, has supported inefficient domestic wheat production 
in order to have at least a minimum domestic supply of_this basic food 
commodity. Europe, a deficit food producing region, supports domestic 
agricultural production in a number of ways. The U.S. supports a 
sugar industry. These actions are taken to mitigate against the 
potential break down of free trade markets. Similarly, on the energy 
side, South Africa supports a synthetic fuel industry, Brazil a major 
alcohol industry, and the U.S. is willing to pay higher prices for 
North Slope oil. These actions are taken to lessen dependence on 
uncertain international supplies. Thus, when a country is short (in 
terms of production) of a critical commodity, it will often place a 
higher value on domestic supplies of that commodity than will the free 
market. 
In the case of national security, most will agree that a barrel 
of domestically produced oil is worth more than a barrel of imported 
oil. By extension, domestically produced alcohol will also command a 
higher value than imported oil. But specifying this value is a poli-
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tical decision. The problem for policy makers intervening in energy 
markets is to know how much more. There is no easy answer to this 
question, however two areas of costs which are generally not reflected 
in market prices can be identified. First, many of the economic and 
military costs associated with maintaining friendly relations with oil 
exporting countries and protecting international oil supply routes 
could be assessed legitimately to the cost of imported oil. Second, a 
less tangible non-market cost is the potential economic disruption 
that would result from an interruption of international oil supply. 
This of course is not a cost until disruption occurs and then the 
level of cost depends on the length and severity of the supply 
interruption. In assessing this cost, an estimate must be made, not 
only of the potential cost but of the probability of occurrence. 
Continued political instability in some oil exporting countries makes 
this an increasingly likely possibility. The emergence and interest 
in synthetic and biomass fuel programs in a number of countries is 
indicative of the level of non-market costs that the political process 
is assessing to imported oil. The issue, in terms of the food-fuel 
conflict is that alcohol need not be competitive with petroleum before 
it becomes a politically attractive alternative. 
An Energy-Agriculture Classification 
The previous discussion has concluded that in general, energy 
markets will experience relative price increases in the near future, 
food markets will probably be able to accommodate commercial demand 
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within reasonable price ranges given "normal" weather conditions, and 
market intervention will be limited largely to protection of national 
food and energy interests. An important issue for world food and 
energy markets is to identify which countries will opt for alcohol 
programs in the next few years. 
A two dimensional country decision matrix is presented in 
Figure 1. While it is clear that each nation state considers many 
factors in determining energy and food policies, the simple matrix 
presented in Figure 1 allows us to catagorize broadly a distribution 
of countries in the world. Two scales are suggested representing 
levels of self sufficiency in energy production and in agricultural 
production. This allows a four quadrant characterization of countries 
and hence policies that are related to deficit and surplus production 
levels of agricultural products and energy. 
Figure 1. ENERGY--AGRICULTURAL COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION 
>. 
tJ 
i:: 
Q) 
•M 
tJ 
·M 
~ 
~ 
;::l 
Cl) 
~ 
...-I 
Q) 
Cl) 
...-I 
cu 
,_. 
;::l 
+J 
...-I 
;::l 
tJ 
·M 
,_. 
Energy Self Sufficiency 
Agr. Surplus 
Energy Deficit 
Agr. Deficit 
Energy Deficit 
Agr. Surplus 
Energy Surplus 
Agr. Deficit 
Energy Surplus 
: Situation I, surplus agricultural production and deficit energy 
production, is likely to be characterized by policies that favor agri-
cultural exports, protect domestic energy production, and as energy 
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prices rise give incentive to alternative energy sources including 
biomass. The relative strength of these policy actions will of course 
depend on the specific location within the quadrant. Situation II, 
surplus production in both energy and agricultural domestic markets, 
will generate less policy intervention in the production choices than I. 
Energy from biomass will be attempted only when profitable but will 
not be discouraged. Situation III, deficit domestic production in 
both markets will elicit protection (incentive) policies for domestic 
production in both agriculture and energy. Energy production from 
biomass is not likely to be encouraged except for the use of waste 
agricultural products. Situation IV will be similar to III with even 
less emphasis on energy from biomass. Therefore, as energy prices 
rise, initial efforts to convert agricultural products to energy would 
be expected in countries falling in the first quadrant (Situation I), 
that is, net agricultural exporters with deficit energy production. 
Energy and agricultural self sufficiency ratios were developed 
for most countries of the world. These ratios are presented in Table 
5 along with additional descriptive data. The ratios for selected 
countries are located in appropriate positions on the policy matrix 
(Figure 2). 
Several general conclusions are apparant from the data in Table 5 
and Figure 2. First, the industrialized countries of Western Europe 
and Japan are the principal countries with deficits in both food and 
energy production. Rapid industrialization was possible for these 
countries during an era of abundant and inexpensive supplies of both 
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energy (oil) and food. Second, with the exception of Canada and 
Australia, the major agricultural exporting countries have energy 
deficits. Third, at the present it appears that energy self 
sufficiency has been more difficult to achieve (or less necessary) than 
food self sufficiency. 
Specific major countries that appear to be early candidates for 
energy from biomass programs are Brazil and much of Central America in 
Latin America; Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, and the Sudan in Africa; 
Thailand and the Philippines in Asia and the United States in North 
America. Of these countries, Brazil has initiated a substantial alco-
hol program, while most of the others are giving serious consideration 
to initiating alcohol programs. The dominant position of the U.S. as 
an agricultural exporter and its critical position as a major energy 
importer clearly focus the food-energy issue and make U.S. policy 
choices in both food and energy important for the world. The specific 
situations for Brazil and the United States are examined in more 
detail below. 
Brazil - A Tilt Toward Energy 
Over the past twenty years, Brazil has embarked on an ambitious 
industrialization program. Central to this program have been the 
development of an automobile industry, a truck transport industry, a 
highway system, and areas of highly mechanized agriculture. Strong 
and increasing reliance on liquid fuels (from petroleum) has been a 
concomitant result of following this development path. Imports now 
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account for over 80 percent of petroleum use. Brazil is thus faced 
with the option of dramatically changing development strategy away 
from dependence on liquid fuels or producing synthetic fuels prin-
cipally from biomass. 
A political decision was made in 1975 to support an alcohol 
industry at a time when alcohol production costs in Brazil were still 
substantially higher than imported petroleum. At the same time, 
prices of petroleum products have been maintained at higher than free 
market levels. This "alcohol plan" is the result of the energy reali-
ties faced by Brazil and the considerable agricultural potential for 
producing alcohol. Hydro electric power and eventually shale oil are 
the only conventional domestic energy resources of significant quan-
tity in Brazil. 
In addition to a favorable agricultural self sufficiency ratio, 
Brazil has large underutilized land resources. The full agricultural 
potential of this resource is unknown, but will add to the agri-
cultural production base when developed. There are currently about 45 
million hectares under crops in Brazil. Full substitution of alcohol 
for imported petroleum at current use levels would require about 16 
million hectares of cropland. The current demand for liquid fuels 
relative to this actual and potential agricultural base leads 
Brazilian authorities to project a probable substitution of biomass 
produced alcohol for a major portion of liquid fuel needs within the 
near future. Currently, over 20 percent of gasoline needs are being 
met by alcohol. 
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The chRnge to alcohol has been relatively easy in the initial 
stages, since some alcohol has traditionally been produced as part of 
a substantial sugar industry. Sugarcane, however, is produced on 
prime agricultural land, and expansion in area planted will put 
pressure on traditional food and export crops such as corn, coffee, 
and soybeans. Alternative crops, such as cassava and sweet sorghum 
which have a broader regional adaption and can be produced on more 
marginal land and under semi arid conditions, are being investigated 
and may eventually be more important than sugarcane as an alcohol 
source. Studies have shown that use of these crops would have posi-
tive regional employment and income effects as well as reduce the 
pressure on export and food crops in prime agricultural areas (6). 
It should be noted that Brazil made the tentative political 
decision to proceed with a major plan when alcohol prices were at 
least twice as high as world gasoline prices (6). As petroleum prices 
have increased rapidly again, the projected expansion rate for alcohol 
production in Brazil has been significantly advanced and the decision 
made to produce new automobile engines that run on pure alcohol. 
While the unique conditions of Brazil cannot be duplicated 
exactly in other countries, it is significant that Thailand, the 
Philippines, Sudan and others are now beginning to explore the possi-
bilities of producing alcohol from biomass. The Brazilian experience 
should provide valuable information for these countries. 
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The United States - A Choice 
Unlike Brazil and many other energy poor countries, the United 
States has several options for dealing with liquid fuel needs. The 
urgency for making a choice is beginning to be felt in political 
circles. Declining domestic oil production and an increasingly 
vulnerable oil import situation are bringing economic, political and 
national security concerns to bear on the energy choices. The overall 
goal is to reduce dependency on imported petroleum. The alternatives 
are conservation, substitution of more abundant energy forms such as 
coal for oil in non-critical uses, and synthetic fuels production from 
coal, shale oil and biomass. Market forces are not likely to provide 
signals soon enough to allow a smooth transition, nor are they likely 
to reflect the full extent of political and national security concerns 
relative to oil imports. 
Within this framework, alcohol from biomass may play a small but 
critical role. If further delays in other choices occur, the demand 
for alcohol in energy markets could put substantial pressure on food 
producing resources. First, it is important to note that unlike 
Brazil, the demand for liquid fuels in the United States far exceeds 
the capacity of agriculture to supply a significant portion. Gasoline 
needs alone are over 100 billion gallons a year. It has been esti-
mated that from 2-5 percent of this need could be met by alcohol 
produced from corn without significantly affecting food prices. 
Beyond this level, a clear choice between fuel and higher food prices 
would have to be made. Second, the two major synthetic fuel 
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alternatives, coal liquids and shale oil, cannot be brought on stream 
in any significant quantity until the 1990s, well beyond the expected 
shortfall in world oil production. In the interim, conservation, coal 
substitution and alcohol from biomass are principal short run 
alternatives. Alcohol from biomass is currently not competitive with 
petroleum, though new technologies and rising petroleum prices will 
probably make alcohol competitive by 1985. 
In summary, plateauing and then declining world oil production 
during the 1980s will bring about sharp increases in oil prices and 
vulnerability for import dependent countries. National policies to 
stimulate and protect local energy production are likely to become 
more common. Alternative sources, including alcohol from biomass will 
become increasingly competitive. Intervention in energy and food 
markets will likely be undertaken, especially in agricultural surplus 
and energy deficit countries. Tropical countries with sugarcane 
potential are likely to be the first to initiate significant alcohol 
production. Grain exporting countries other than the U.S. are not 
expected to enter the alcohol market until alcohol production costs 
are competitive with petroleum. Choices made in the U.S. are critical 
for both food and energy markets since U.S. transactions dominate both 
international markets. Within the U.S., alcohol from biomass can play 
a critical role in providing a bridge from projected declining 
domestic oil production in the 1980s to initiation of a synthetic fuel 
industry based on shale oil and coal liquids in the 1990s. 
Table 5. Energy and Agricultural Measures for Selected Countries 
Self Sufficiency Ratios Per Capita Consumption 
Agricultural Commercial 
Country Production (1974-76) Energy (1978) Population Energy Oil 
and All Mid-1979 Food (kilograms of Arable Land Used 
Region Cereal Food G.V.P. Sources Petroleum (millions) (calories) oil equivalent) (% of potential) 
(1) (2) (3) ( 4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) 
Africa 
Algeria 48 70 66 779 1269 18 2357 468 232 83 
Angola 74 95 141 935 1101 7 2063 131 109 8 
Benin 92 104 107 0 0 3 2153 38 36 51 
Burundi 94 100 108 15 0 4 2260 8 6 83 
Cameroon 88 111 131 20 0 8 2408 81 65 50 
Central Africa 87 91 108 9 0 2 2250 30 27 23 I Chad 95 113 131 0 0 4 1793 15 15 41 N 
°' Congo 31 90 91 1188 1322 2 2234 119 106 6 I 
Egypt 74 87 90 186 217 41 2716 315 250 99 
Ethiopia 97 104 108 8 0 32 1838 13 12 57 
Gabon 12 67 47 1726 2262 1 2403 1246 937 4 
Gambia 62 143 144 0 0 1 2281 73 73 70 
Ghana 79 139 137 31 2 12 2014 112 80 46 
Guinea 91 98 99 2 0 5 1921 62 61 61 
Ivory Coast 86 135 190 2 0 8 2563 243 238 81 
Kenya 102 102 115 4 0 15 2060 95 86 59 
Liberia 79 89 122 5 0 2 2374 269 255 28 
Libya 29 52 49 3113 3004 3 2946 1285 1285 83 
Madagascar 95 99 108 3 0 8 2480 53 49 13 
Malawi 99 103 123 13 0 6 2282 35 22 59 
Mali 88 98 103 3 0 6 2114 21 21 81 
Mauritania 1 150 151 0 0 2 2557 138 135 95 
Mauritius 20 86 85 2 0 1 1894 277 270 43 
Morocco 79 94 92 19 1 20 2568 194 160 87 
Mozumbique 79 107 113 89 0 10 1930 103 49 17 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) 
Africa (cont'd) 
Niger 96 103 103 0 0 5 2051 26 25 93 
Nigeria 91 102 102 1811 2178 83 2291 72 59 80 
Rwanda 92 100 107 23 0 5 2277 12 9 91 
Senegal 59 109 116 0 0 6 2228 123 123 58 
Sierra Leone 93 99 101 0 0 3 2101 68 68 85 
Somalia 66 105 103 0 0 4 2129 67 67 56 
South Africa 127 112 107 93 0 28 2945 2162 390 66 
Sudan 96 104 113 2 0 21 2247 117 115 27 
Tanzania 76 96 108 16 0 17 2089 44 41 25 
Togo 93 111 118 0 0 2 2035 65 61 95 
Tunisia 77 92 88 202 225 6 2657 369 313 95 I Uganda 98 99 126 14 0 13 2070 33 30 18 N 
...., 
Upper Volta 94 103 107 0 0 7 1997 17 17 79 I 
Zaire 67 97 103 120 147 28 2312 47 28 6 
Zambia 90 88 91 68 0 6 2018 322 136 10 
Zimbabwe-Rhodes 100 106 130 73 0 8 2545 394 90 14 
North America 
Canada 168 119 114 112 95 24 3346 6755 3316 48 
U.S.A. 149 111 113 81 60 231 3537 7737 3642 49 
Central America 
Costa Rica 76 153 187 16 0 2 2477 384 322 49 
Cuba 25 139 138 1 1 10 2636 794 782 99 
Dominican Repub 56 124 141 1 0 6 2107 316 314 89 
El Salvador 84 96 164 10 0 5 2075 181 163 87 
Guatemala 84 117 167 5 3 7 2166 177 172 72 
Haiti 83 95 102 10 0 6 2040 39 35 83 
Honduras 83 128 149 6 0 4 2074 193 181 32 
Jamaica 3 77 77 1 0 2 2663 1240 1235 87 
Mexico 86 98 102 128 142 66 2668 941 642 67 
Nicaragua 90 122 184 4 0 2 2453 351 338 36 
Panama 82 112 112 2 0 2 2357 674 660 34 
Trinidad, To bag 12 68 69 372 750 1 2684 3377 1414 63 
Table 5. Energy and Agricultural Measures for Selected Countries 
Self Sufficiency Ratios Per Capita Consumption 
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South America 
Argentina 168 124 124 92 99 27 3359 1274 885 66 
Bolivia 74 98 102 218 134 5 2134 250 218 1 
Brazil 94 108 118 34 18 124 2522 540 404 19 
Chile 55 84 81 53 27 11 2644 678 466 96 
Columbia 92 104 124 103 105 26 2255 476 259 17 
Ecuador 82 114 122 371 382 8 2109 344 331 61 
Guyana 132 157 154 0 0 1 2431 728 728 5 
Paraguay 88 111 122 12 0 3 2779 136 123 6 
Peru 59 89 95 109 112 17 2286 442 375 24 
Surinam 158 107 104 16 0 2286 1463 1182 1 
Uruguay 135 125 119 7 0 3 3098 717 660 17 I Venezuela 40 77 79 471 858 14 2480 2033 998 17 N 
a:; 
I 
Asia-Middle East 
Cyprus 45 112 110 0 0 1 3047 1338 1338 98 
Iran 81 84 86 672 1136 38 3193 1230 658 99 
Iraq 63 76 74 2458 3352 13 2306 430 312 101 
Israel 18 92 93 1 1 4 3145 1607 1596 60 
Jordan 37 65 63 0 0 3 2067 364 364 99 
Lebanon 13 73 71 3 0 3 2495 637 614 88 
Saudi Arabia 24 50 47 4818 5178 8 2472 888 825 87 
Syria 87 89 96 200 213 8 2616 659 580 86 
Turkey 97 100 104 35 15 44 2916 539 399 98 
Yemen, A.R. 81 82 81 0 0 2 2179 36 36 89 
Yemen, P.D.R. 37 64 65 0 0 5 1897 356 356 87 
Asia-Far East 
Afghanistan 100 103 105 434 2 15 1974 32 22 94 
Bangladesh 93 93 94 39 0 88 1945 29 15 100 
Burma 106 104 104 121 142 34 2211 43 32 24 
China 101 102 102 103 113 1024 2439 569 100 131 
Kampuchea 89 94 95 0 0 8 1857 2 2 64 
India 95 98 99 85 51 670 1949 121 34 93 
Indonesia 92 98 105 344 384 148 2115 189 159 55 
. . 
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Asia-Far East (cont'd) 
Japan 58 73 69 8 1 116 2847 2602 1934 81 
Korea, D.P.R. 100 99 97 96 0 19 2730 1838 74 92 
Korea, Rep. 79 87 83 36 0 40 2682 925 565 107 
Lao 87 92 92 14 0 4 1979 41 39 40 
Malaysia 71 137 187 153 171 13 2594 487 429 54 
Nepal 104 100 100 12 0 14 2070 7 6 85 
Pakistan 101 98 99 65 13 80 2255 117 47 72 
Philippines 91 122 121 6 0 47 2155 231 217 66 
Sri Lanka 58 82 112 10 0 14 2043 74 67 83 
Thailand 125 129 131 5 0 46 2193 222 210 57 
Viet Nam 88 92 92 99 0 53 2032 85 13 77 I 
N 
'° Western Europe I 
Austria 96 96 91 34 17 8 3547 2754 1397 75 
Belgium 41 98 91 14 0 10 3565 4134 2113 72 
Denmark 104 158 148 2 2 5 3432 3689 3001 73 
Finland 100 101 92 9 2 5 3130 3541 2425 54 
France 166 110 105 20 3 54 3458 2971 1867 67 
Germany, Fed. R. 82 81 76 45 4 61 3362 4092 2013 80 
Greece 85 105 109 25 0 9 3441 1310 942 60 
Iceland 0 88 80 30 0 2939 3295 2309 100 
Ireland 73 158 153 24 0 3 3519 2239 1549 41 
Italy 74 83 81 14 1 57 3462 2197 1552 65 
Malta 4 45 41 0 0 3103 736 736 57 
Netherlands 26 121 113 132 9 14 3324 3624 1387 73 
Norway 54 79 72 228 212 4 3126 3790 2017 42 
Portugal 48 81 78 13 0 10 3424 701 581 68 
Spain 78 96 93 26 3 38 3210 1636 1121 58 
Sweden 122 98 88 18 0 8 3168 4050 3160 61 
Switzerland 34 80 74 22 0 6 3386 2510 1909 64 
U.K. 66 72 67 84 65 56 3305 3546 1428 63 
Yugoslavia 97 99 97 62 29 22 3469 1384 640 73 
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Self Sufficiency Ratios Per Capita Consumption 
Agricultural Commercial 
Country Production (1974-76) Energy (1978) Population Energy Oil 
and All Mid-1979 Food (kilograms of Arable Land Used 
Region Cereal Food G.V.P. Sources Petroleum (millions) (calories) oil equivalent) (% of potential) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) 
Eastern Europe 
Albania 94 100 104 191 244 3 2624 679 428 88 
Bulgaria 96 106 106 32 1 9 3594 3415 1488 73 
Czechoslovakia 89 94 90 73 1 15 3450 5123 1097 65 
German Dem. Rep. 70 91 88 70 1 17 3610 4844 980 73 
Hungary 113 115 111 58 29 11 3494 2348 893 75 
Poland 81 98 97 109 2 35 3647 3806 429 79 
Romania 98 105 103 92 98 22 3368 2749 714 88 
u.s.s.R. 95 97 97 128 171 264 3443 3742 1314 66 
I Oceania w 
0 Australia 254 170 161 135 85 14 3413 4505 1864 29 I 
New Zealand 87 164 158 57 16 3 3443 2579 1316 36 
Sources: Agricultural Production, F.A.O. preliminary data (3) 
Energy - United Nations 
Population - Environmental Fund 
. . 
.. 
• 
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